Articolo
| DOI |
10.7336/academicus.2014.09.03 |
| URL |
https://academicus.edu.al/?subpage=volumes&nr=9 |
| Per questo DOI è attiva la Multiple Resolution: |
| MR URL |
https://academicus.edu.al |
| MR URL |
https://academicus.edu.al/nr9/Academicus-MMXIV-9-043-054.html |
| MR URL |
https://academicus.edu.al/nr9/Academicus-MMXIV-9-043-054.pdf |
| MR URL |
mailto:info@academicus.edu.al |
| MR URL |
https://academicus.edu.al/images/front_end/academicus.jpg |
| MR URL |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| DATI DI ACCESSO: |
|
OA - Accesso aperto |
| Licenza OA |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
Titolo completo
Inglese
(eng)
|
Academicus International Scientific Journal |
| Editore (01) |
Academicus International Scientific Journal |
| Paese di pubblicazione |
Albania
(AL)
|
|
ISSN
|
20793715 |
| Formato del prodotto |
Rivista Stampata
(JB)
|
|
ISSN
|
23091088 |
| Formato del prodotto |
Rivista Online
(JD)
|
| Numero del volume |
9 |
| Data del fascicolo (YYYY/MM) |
2014 / 01 |
Titolo
Inglese
(eng)
|
Pragmatic Objectivity |
| Numero di Pagine |
12 |
| Prima Pagina |
43 |
| Ultima Pagina |
54 |
| Lingua del testo |
Inglese
(eng)
|
| Data di publicazione (YYYY/MM) |
2014 / 01 |
| Copyright |
2014, Academicus |
Abstract
Descrizione principale
(01)
|
Nicholas Rescher writes that “objectivity is not something we infer from the data; it is something we must presuppose. It
is something that we postulate or presume from the very outset of our dealings with people’s claims about the world’s facts”.
Such definition is just the opposite of objectivity conceived of in classical terms, but it cannot be equated with an idealistic
viewpoint according to which objectivity is something that our mind simply creates in the process of reflection. It is, rather,
a sort of cross-product of the encounter between our mind-shaped capacities, and a surrounding reality made up of things that
are real in the usual meaning of the term. Science itself gives us some crucial insights in this direction, since it shows
that we see, say, tables and trees in a certain way which, however, does not match the image that scientific instruments are
able to attain. Does this mean that our commonsense view of the world is totally wrong and that nature deceives us? This is
not the case. The difference between the commonsense and the scientific image of the world is explainable by the fact that
we are evolutionary creatures. Nature has simply endowed human beings with tools and capacities that enable them to survive
in an environment which - at least in remote eras - was largely hostile. Our way of seeing tables and trees is what is requested
for carrying on a successful fight for the survival of the species: nothing more - and nothing less - is needed for achieving
this fundamental goal. Turning once again to the problem of ontological objectivity, the picture has now gained both strength
and clarity. If we recall that human endeavors, although occurring in a largely autonomous social and linguistic world, are
nevertheless limited by the constraints that natural reality forces upon us, we begin to understand that the social-linguistic
world itself is not a boat freely floating without directions. If the boat is there, it means that an explanation of its presence
is likely to be obtained if only we are patient enough to look for it. Some kind of hand must be on the wheel, giving the
boat indications on Contrary to other pragmatist-flavored positions popular nowadays, this approach maintains that universality
has a fundamental and unavoidable function in our rational endeavors. This is due to the fact that “presupposition” and “hypothetical
reasoning” are key ingredients of our very capacity to rationalize the world in which we live. Indeed, there can be no rationality
without universality.
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