I METADATI DI QUESTO DOI SONO STATI AGGIORNATI IL: 2025-07-30 15:49
Titolo completo
HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND POLICY
Editore
FrancoAngeli
ISSN
2240-9971 (Rivista Stampata)
2280-188X (Rivista Online)
Numero del fascicolo
1
Designazione del fascicolo
1
Data del fascicolo
2025
Titolo completo
Strong, Weak, and Zero-Sum: A Commonsean Solution to Maffeo Pantaleoni's Quest for Contractual Settlements
Di (autore)
Prima Pagina
59
Ultima Pagina
79
Lingua del testo
Inglese
Data di publicazione
2025/06
Copyright
2025 FrancoAngeli srl
Descrizione principale
The paper explores Maffeo Pantaleoni's 1898 essay, focusing on his analysis of why rational agents enter mutualistic agreements, i.e. contracts, despite common predatory and parasitic behaviors. Pantaleoni classifies social relationships into predatory, parasitic, and mutualistic categories, anticipating the zero-sum logic where wealth is redistributed rather than created. The paper highlights the limitations of Pantaleoni's neglect of the legal system in shaping contracts, contrasting his ideas with legal realism, which emphasizes law's role in reducing transaction costs. It also connects Pantaleoni's work with John Rogers Commons's theory, extending his ideas into modern institutional economics.
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