Vedi metadata
I METADATI DI QUESTO DOI SONO STATI AGGIORNATI IL: 2024-01-10 22:54
Cite as
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Titolo completo
EPISTEMOLOGIA
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Editore
FrancoAngeli
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ISSN
0392-9760 (Rivista Stampata)
1825-652X (Rivista Online)
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Numero del fascicolo
2
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Designazione del fascicolo
2
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Data del fascicolo (YYYY/MM)
2015/02
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Titolo completo
Causal powers as metaphysical grounds for laws or nature
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Di (autore)
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Prima Pagina
183
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Ultima Pagina
201
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Lingua del testo
Inglese
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Data di publicazione
2015/02
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Copyright
2014 FrancoAngeli srl
Introduzione o prefazione
As Bas van Fraassen clearly put it in his Laws and Symmetry (1989), any adequate philosophical account of laws of nature must at least solve two main problems: the problem of identification and the problem of inference. After a short presentation of these two problems and a brief survey of several, in my view unsuccessful, regularist and necessitarian philosophical attempts solve them, a neo-Aristotelian necessitarian account of laws is offered, which resorts to dispositions or causal powers, and which provides an attractive solution to the two problems raised by van Fraassen. Such neo-Aristotelian account also explains why there are regularities in nature and why laws support the truth of counterfactual conditionals. The papers ends with a succinct discussion of the connection of dispositions with experience.
Elenco citazioni del
10.3280/EPIS2014-002001
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