Vedi metadata
I METADATI DI QUESTO DOI SONO STATI AGGIORNATI IL: 2024-01-10 22:53
Cite as
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Titolo completo
EPISTEMOLOGIA
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Editore
FrancoAngeli
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ISSN
0392-9760 (Rivista Stampata)
1825-652X (Rivista Online)
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Numero del fascicolo
1
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Designazione del fascicolo
1
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Data del fascicolo (YYYY/MM)
2014/07
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Titolo completo
Approximate truth vs. empirical adequacy
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Di (autore)
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Prima Pagina
106
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Ultima Pagina
118
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Lingua del testo
Inglese
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Data di publicazione
2014/07
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Copyright
2014 FrancoAngeli srl
Introduzione o prefazione
Suppose that scientific realists believe that a successful theory is approximately true, and that constructive empiricists believe that it is empirically adequate. Whose belief is more likely to be false? The problem of underdetermination does not yield an answer to this question one way or the other, but the pessimistic induction does. The pessimistic induction, if correct, indicates that successful theories, both past and current, are empirically inadequate. It is arguable, however, that they are approximately true. Therefore, scientific realists overall take less epistemic risk than constructive empiricists.
Elenco citazioni del
10.3280/EPIS2014-001007
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