Vedi metadata
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Cite as
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Titolo completo
ECONOMIA PUBBLICA
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Editore
FrancoAngeli
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ISSN
0390-6140 (Rivista Stampata)
1972-5566 (Rivista Online)
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Numero del fascicolo
3
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Designazione del fascicolo
3
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Data del fascicolo
2023
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Titolo completo
Tax evasion, tax reward and the optimal fiscal policy
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Di (autore)
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Prima Pagina
309
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Ultima Pagina
327
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Lingua del testo
Inglese
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Data di publicazione
2024/02
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Copyright
2023 FrancoAngeli srl
Descrizione principale
This theoretical paper studies the optimal fiscal policy in the presence of both pen- alties for tax evasion and rewards for tax compliance. Indeed, the presence of tax rewards changes the behaviour of firms and amplifies the role of the tax authority. In general, tax reward is able to reduce corporate tax evasion. However, the opti- mal fiscal policy depends on the fiscal scenario. Precisely, audit emerges as the main element of fiscal policy when tax evasion is widespread (negative scenario); whereas, in the positive fiscal scenario (where most people comply with tax rules), the range of fiscal policy choices is broader.
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