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10.3280/SPE2025-001004

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Vatiero M. 2021. The Theory of Transaction in Institutional Economics: A History. London, Routledge.

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Unstructured Zitierung

Vatiero M. 2024. When specific investments protect against the hold-up risk in a transaction: an ode to the Fundamental Transformation à la Oliver Williamson, working paper, January 05, 2025. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5083548 or

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