DIESE DOI-METADATEN WURDEN ZULETZT AKTUALISIERT AM: 2025-07-30 15:49
Vollständiger Titel
HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND POLICY
Verlag
FrancoAngeli
ISSN
2240-9971 (Gedruckte Zeitschrift)
2280-188X (Online-Zeitschrift)
Nummer der Ausgabe
1
Andere Beschreibung der Ausgabe
1
Erscheinungsdatum der Ausgabe
2025
Vollständiger Titel
Strong, Weak, and Zero-Sum: A Commonsean Solution to Maffeo Pantaleoni's Quest for Contractual Settlements
Von (Autor)
Erste Seite
59
Letzte Seite
79
Sprache des Textes
Englisch
Erscheinungsdatum
2025/06
Copyright
2025 FrancoAngeli srl
Abstract/Hauptbeschreibung
The paper explores Maffeo Pantaleoni's 1898 essay, focusing on his analysis of why rational agents enter mutualistic agreements, i.e. contracts, despite common predatory and parasitic behaviors. Pantaleoni classifies social relationships into predatory, parasitic, and mutualistic categories, anticipating the zero-sum logic where wealth is redistributed rather than created. The paper highlights the limitations of Pantaleoni's neglect of the legal system in shaping contracts, contrasting his ideas with legal realism, which emphasizes law's role in reducing transaction costs. It also connects Pantaleoni's work with John Rogers Commons's theory, extending his ideas into modern institutional economics.
Unstructured Zitierung
Bellanca N. 1997. From “Principii” to “Erotemi”: an organic interpretation. In Baldassarri M. (ed.) Maffeo Pantaleoni. At
the Origin of the Italian School of Public Finance. London, Macmillan, 97-153.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-14537-9_3
Unstructured Zitierung
Bini P. 2008. Pantaleoni visto da Piero Bini. Rome, LUISS University Press.
Unstructured Zitierung
Buchanan J.M. 2005. Afraid to be free. Dependency as desideratum. Public Choice, 124, 19-31.
https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-28038-3_2
Unstructured Zitierung
Chinoi S. et al. 2023. Zero-sum thinking and the roots of US political divide. NBER Working Paper Series, #31688.
https://doi.org/10.3386/w31688
Unstructured Zitierung
Coase R.N. 1960. The problem of social cost. Journal of Law & Economics, 3, 1-44.
https://doi.org/10.1086/466560
Unstructured Zitierung
Commons J.R. 1932. The problem of correlating law economics and ethics. Wisconsin Law Review, 8, 3-26.
Unstructured Zitierung
Ely J.W. 1998. The Guardian of Every Other Right. A Constitutional History of Property Rights (2nd ed.). New York, Oxford University Press.
Unstructured Zitierung
Fiorito L. 2010. John R. Commons, Wesley N. Hohfeld, and the origins of transactional economics. History of Political Economy,
42, 267-295.
https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-2010-003
Unstructured Zitierung
Giocoli N. 2014. Predatory Pricing in Antitrust Law and Economics. London, Routledge.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315832692
Unstructured Zitierung
Hale R.L. 1943. Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty. Columbia Law Review, 43, 603-628.
https://doi.org/10.2307/1117229
Unstructured Zitierung
Holmes O.W. Jr. 1894. Privilege, malice, and intent. Harvard Law Review, 8, 1-14.
https://doi.org/10.2307/1322381
Unstructured Zitierung
Pantaleoni M. 1898. An Attempt to Analyse the Concepts of ‘Strong and Weak’ in Their Economic Connection. Economic Journal,
8, 183-205.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2957359
Unstructured Zitierung
Pantaleoni M. 1907. Una visione cinematografica del progresso della scienza economica (1870-1907). In Erotemi di Economia, vol. 1, 1925, 189-222.
Unstructured Zitierung
Peart S. J. and Levy D. M. 2005. The “Vanity of the Philosopher”. From Equality to Hierarchy in Post-Classical Economics.
Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.92892
Unstructured Zitierung
Peller G. 2016. Privilege. Georgetown Law Journal, 104, 883-920.
Unstructured Zitierung
Rubin P.H. 2003. Folk economics. Southern Economic Journal, 70, 157-171.
https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2003.tb00561.x
Unstructured Zitierung
Smith A. 1776. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. London, Methuen & Co. (5th ed.), 1904.
https://doi.org/10.1093/oseo/instance.00043218
Unstructured Zitierung
Vatiero M. 2021. The Theory of Transaction in Institutional Economics: A History. London, Routledge.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429202612
Unstructured Zitierung
Vatiero M. 2024. When specific investments protect against the hold-up risk in a transaction: an ode to the Fundamental Transformation
à la Oliver Williamson, working paper, January 05, 2025. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5083548 or
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5083548
Unstructured Zitierung
Williamson O.E. 2005. The economics of governance. American Economic Review Paper and Proceedings, 95, 1-18.
https://doi.org/10.1257/000282805774669880