DIESE DOI-METADATEN WURDEN ZULETZT AKTUALISIERT AM: 2024-01-10 22:54
Vollständiger Titel
RIVISTA DI ECONOMIA AGRARIA
Verlag
FrancoAngeli
ISSN
0035-6190 (Gedruckte Zeitschrift)
2281-1559 (Online-Zeitschrift)
Nummer der Ausgabe
3
Andere Beschreibung der Ausgabe
3
Erscheinungsdatum der Ausgabe (YYYY/MM)
2014/07
Vollständiger Titel
Empirical Research in Agricultural Contracts: Watch your Step
Von (Autor)
Erste Seite
27
Letzte Seite
40
Sprache des Textes
Italienisch
Erscheinungsdatum
2014/07
Copyright
2013 FrancoAngeli srl
Vorwort
Il presente studio confronta l'evoluzione della teoria dell'organizzazione economica e la struttura dei contratti agricoli, sulla base di specifiche evidenze empiriche. In sostanza, se gli economisti dell'organizzazione si occupano dell'analisi del funzionamento del sistema economico, l'analisi sviluppata nel lavoro dimostra come l'uso di dati raccolti sui contratti agrari non fornisce informazioni sufficienti e pone attenzione solo ad alcuni aspetti della struttura degli incentivi presenti nella maggior parte degli accordi istituzionali. L'assunto è che se si utilizzano dati basati su collezioni contrattuali esistenti, non considerando le dimensioni delle transazioni regolate con altre tipologie di contratti formali, o non considerando aspetti relazionali e di apprendimento dinamici incorporati nella relazione contrattuale, i risultati possono portare a false conclusioni.
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