Anzeige des vollständigen DOI-Metadaten-Sets
DIESE DOI-METADATEN WURDEN ZULETZT AKTUALISIERT AM: 2024-01-10 22:56
Cite as
-
Vollständiger Titel
PARADIGMI
-
Verlag
FrancoAngeli
-
ISSN
1120-3404 (Gedruckte Zeitschrift)
2035-357X (Online-Zeitschrift)
-
Nummer der Ausgabe
3
-
Andere Beschreibung der Ausgabe
3
-
Erscheinungsdatum der Ausgabe (YYYY/MM)
2016/01
-
Vollständiger Titel
Consciousness, illusory freedom, double feel
-
Von (Autor)
-
Erste Seite
11
-
Letzte Seite
22
-
Sprache des Textes
Englisch
-
Erscheinungsdatum
2016/01
-
Copyright
2015 FrancoAngeli srl
Vorwort
A proposito della coscienza si è scritto molto, sia in articoli scientifici, sia in libri destinati a un più vasto pubblico. Il tema risale almeno a Cartesio e Spinoza e fu già ammirevolmente trattato da Huxley (1974). L'opinione corrente, largamente condivisa, considera che le relative difficoltà tecniche, ma ancor più quelle metodologiche, sono talmente difformi da quelle della normale impresa scientifica da richiedere una completa revisione di ciò che si intende con "conoscere" e "spiegare". Prendendo come un dato non ulteriormente analizzato l'esperienza in prima persona della coscienza, queste sparse osservazioni cercheranno di estrarre ciò che è conosciuto della coscienza in terza persona, distinguendolo prudentemente da ciò che ne viene detto in modo più incerto e talvolta infondato. Ulteriormente il libero arbitrio, una componente importante della comune concezione di coscienza, verrà espunto dalla coscienza fenomenica perché non esiste. In conseguenza ciò che rimane da spiegare è l'incorreggibile illusione di scegliere liberamente, nonché le conseguenze etiche, giuridiche e psicologiche di una tale illusione
Zitierungen des
10.3280/PARA2015-003002
Unstructured Zitierung
Block N. (1978). Troubles with functionalism. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 9: 261-325.
Unstructured Zitierung
Block N. (2009). Comparing the major theories of consciousness. In: Gazzaniga M., ed. The cognitive neurosciences IV. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press: 1111-1123.
Unstructured Zitierung
Brillouin L. (1956). Science and information theory. New York: Academic Press.
Unstructured Zitierung
Chalmers D. (1996). The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
Unstructured Zitierung
Churchland Paul and Churchland Patricia (1998). On the contrary: critical essays, 1987-1997. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press.
Unstructured Zitierung
Damasio A. (1999). The feeling of what happens: body and emotion in the making of consciousness. New York: Harcout Brace.
Unstructured Zitierung
Damasio A. (2003). Looking for Spinoza: joy, sorrow and the feeling brain. Orlando: Harcourt Inc.
Unstructured Zitierung
Dehaene S. (2014). Consciousness and the brain: deciphering how the brain codes our thoughts. New York: Viking Press.
Unstructured Zitierung
Dennett D. (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
Unstructured Zitierung
Derrida J. (2006). L’animal que donc je suis. Paris: Editions Galilée.
Unstructured Zitierung
Fenigstein A., Scheier M.F. and Buss A.H. (1975), Public and private self-consciousness: assessment and theory. Journal of
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 43, 4: 522-527.
https://doi.org/10.1037/h0076760
Unstructured Zitierung
Gray J.A. (2004). Consciousness: creeping up on the hard problem. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Unstructured Zitierung
Hofstadter D. (2007). I am a strange loop. New York: Basic Books.
Unstructured Zitierung
Huxley T.H. (1874). On the hypothesis that animals are automata, and its history. In: Huxley T.H. (2011). Collected essays, Volume 1, methods and results. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 199-250.
Unstructured Zitierung
Koch C. (2004). The quest for consciousness: a neurobiological approach. Englewood: Roberts and Co.
Unstructured Zitierung
Kurzweil R. (2005). The singularity is near. New York: Viking Press.
Unstructured Zitierung
Libet B. (1985). Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 8, 4: 529-539.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00044903
Unstructured Zitierung
Llinás R. (2001). I of the vortex: from neurons to self. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press.
Unstructured Zitierung
Lonergan B. (1957). Insight: A study of human understanding. London: Longmans.
Unstructured Zitierung
Minsky M. (1968). Matter, mind, and models. In: Minsky M., Semantic information processing. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press.
Unstructured Zitierung
Nagel T. (1986), The view from nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Unstructured Zitierung
O’Regan J. K. (2011). Why red doesn’t sound like a bell. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199775224.001.0001
Unstructured Zitierung
Penrose R. (2002). The emperor’s new mind. Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks.
Unstructured Zitierung
Shannon C.E. and McCarthy J., eds. (1956). Automata studies. Annals of Mathematics Studies, 34: Princeton University Press: 3-41.
Unstructured Zitierung
Searle J.R. (2000). Consciousness, free action and the brain. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7, 10: 3-22.
Unstructured Zitierung
Singer P. and Cavalieri P., eds. (1993). The great ape project: equality beyond humanity. London: Fourth Estate.
Unstructured Zitierung
Tononi G. (2012). Phi: a voyage from the brain to the soul. USA: Random House.
Unstructured Zitierung
Wegner D.M. (2003). The illusion of conscious will. Bradford, Cambridge (MA): MIT Press.