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Cite as
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Vollständiger Titel
EPISTEMOLOGIA
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Verlag
FrancoAngeli
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ISSN
0392-9760 (Gedruckte Zeitschrift)
1825-652X (Online-Zeitschrift)
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Nummer der Ausgabe
2
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Andere Beschreibung der Ausgabe
2
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Erscheinungsdatum der Ausgabe (YYYY/MM)
2015/02
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Vollständiger Titel
Causal powers as metaphysical grounds for laws or nature
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Von (Autor)
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Erste Seite
183
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Letzte Seite
201
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Sprache des Textes
Englisch
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Erscheinungsdatum
2015/02
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Copyright
2014 FrancoAngeli srl
Vorwort
As Bas van Fraassen clearly put it in his Laws and Symmetry (1989), any adequate philosophical account of laws of nature must at least solve two main problems: the problem of identification and the problem of inference. After a short presentation of these two problems and a brief survey of several, in my view unsuccessful, regularist and necessitarian philosophical attempts solve them, a neo-Aristotelian necessitarian account of laws is offered, which resorts to dispositions or causal powers, and which provides an attractive solution to the two problems raised by van Fraassen. Such neo-Aristotelian account also explains why there are regularities in nature and why laws support the truth of counterfactual conditionals. The papers ends with a succinct discussion of the connection of dispositions with experience.
Zitierungen des
10.3280/EPIS2014-002001
Unstructured Zitierung
Armstrong D. (1983). What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139171700
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Bigelow J.C., Ellis B., Lierse C. (1992). The World as One of Kind: Natural Necessity and Laws of Nature, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 43, pp. 371-388.
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Bird A. (2007). Nature’s Metaphysics. Laws and Properties, Oxford, Clarendon Press. Blondeau J., Ghins M. (2012). Is There an Intrinsic Criterion for Causal Lawlike Statements? International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 26, pp. 381-401.
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Ellis B. (2001). Scientific Essentialism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
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Ellis B. (2002). The Philosophy of Nature, Chesham, Acumen.
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Ghins M. (2010). Bas van Fraassen on Scientific Representation, Analysis, 70, pp. 524-536.
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Ghins M. (2013a). Uma Introdução à Filosofia da Natureza. Representação, realismo e leis
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científicas. Editora da Universidade Federal do Paraná, Curitiba, Brazil. (French version forthcoming).
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Ghins M. (2013b). Semirealism, Concrete Structures and Theory Change, Erkenntnis, 78, pp. 19-27.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-012-9416-1
Unstructured Zitierung
Lewis D. (1973). Counterfactuals, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press.
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Mumford S. (1998). Dispositions, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
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Mumford S. (2004). Laws in Nature, Abingdon, Routledge.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203458426
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Psillos S. (2011). Moving Molecules Above the Scientific Horizon: On Perrin’s Case for Realism, Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 42, pp. 339-363.
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van Fraassen B. (1980). The Scientific Image, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1093/0198244274.001.0001
Unstructured Zitierung
van Fraassen B. (1989). Laws and Symmetry, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1093/0198248601.001.0001
Unstructured Zitierung
van Fraassen B. (2000). Michel Ghins on the Empirical Versus the Theoretical, Foundations of Physics, 30, pp. 1643-1655
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026498100498