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Cite as
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Vollständiger Titel
EPISTEMOLOGIA
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Verlag
FrancoAngeli
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ISSN
0392-9760 (Gedruckte Zeitschrift)
1825-652X (Online-Zeitschrift)
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Nummer der Ausgabe
1
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Andere Beschreibung der Ausgabe
1
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Erscheinungsdatum der Ausgabe (YYYY/MM)
2014/07
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Vollständiger Titel
Approximate truth vs. empirical adequacy
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Von (Autor)
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Erste Seite
106
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Letzte Seite
118
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Sprache des Textes
Englisch
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Erscheinungsdatum
2014/07
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Copyright
2014 FrancoAngeli srl
Vorwort
Suppose that scientific realists believe that a successful theory is approximately true, and that constructive empiricists believe that it is empirically adequate. Whose belief is more likely to be false? The problem of underdetermination does not yield an answer to this question one way or the other, but the pessimistic induction does. The pessimistic induction, if correct, indicates that successful theories, both past and current, are empirically inadequate. It is arguable, however, that they are approximately true. Therefore, scientific realists overall take less epistemic risk than constructive empiricists.
Zitierungen des
10.3280/EPIS2014-001007
Unstructured Zitierung
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https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00061
Unstructured Zitierung
Lange M. (2002). Baseball, pessimistic inductions and the turnover fallacy, Analysis, 62(4), pp. 2881-2885.
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Mizrahi M. (2012). Why the ultimate argument for scientific realism ultimately fails, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 43(1), pp. 132-138.
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Park S. (2001). Scientific realism vs. scientific antirealism, Ph.D. Dissertation, Tucson, Arizona University Press.
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Park S. (2009). Philosophical responses to underdetermination in science, Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 40(1), pp. 115-124.
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Park S. (2011). Coherence of our best scientific theory, Foundations of Science, 16(1), pp. 21-30.
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Park S. (2014). Accepting our best scientific theories, Pensée, 76(3), pp. 131-139.
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Poincaré H. (1905/1952). Science and hypothesis. New York, Dover.
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Psillos S. (1997). How not to defend constructive empiricism: A rejoinder. The Philosophical Quarterly 47, pp. 369-372.
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Psillos S. (1999). Scientific realism: How science tracks truth. New York, Routledge.
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Putnam H. (1975). Realism in mathematics and elsewhere. In Philosophical Papers vol. 1., Cambridge University Press.
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Stanford K. (2000). An antirealist explanation of the success of science, Philosophy of Science 67, pp. 266-284.
Unstructured Zitierung
van Fraassen B. (1980). The scientific image. Oxford, Oxford University Press.