DIESE DOI-METADATEN WURDEN ZULETZT AKTUALISIERT AM: 2024-03-14 11:43
Vollständiger Titel
ECONOMIA PUBBLICA
Verlag
FrancoAngeli
ISSN
0390-6140 (Gedruckte Zeitschrift)
1972-5566 (Online-Zeitschrift)
Nummer der Ausgabe
3
Andere Beschreibung der Ausgabe
3
Erscheinungsdatum der Ausgabe
2023
Vollständiger Titel
Tax evasion, tax reward and the optimal fiscal policy
Von (Autor)
Erste Seite
309
Letzte Seite
327
Sprache des Textes
Englisch
Erscheinungsdatum
2024/02
Copyright
2023 FrancoAngeli srl
Abstract/Hauptbeschreibung
This theoretical paper studies the optimal fiscal policy in the presence of both pen- alties for tax evasion and rewards for tax compliance. Indeed, the presence of tax rewards changes the behaviour of firms and amplifies the role of the tax authority. In general, tax reward is able to reduce corporate tax evasion. However, the opti- mal fiscal policy depends on the fiscal scenario. Precisely, audit emerges as the main element of fiscal policy when tax evasion is widespread (negative scenario); whereas, in the positive fiscal scenario (where most people comply with tax rules), the range of fiscal policy choices is broader.
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