Serial Article
| DOI |
10.7336/academicus.2012.06.02 |
| URL |
https://academicus.edu.al/?subpage=volumes&nr=6 |
| Multiple Resolution: |
| MR URL |
https://academicus.edu.al |
| MR URL |
https://academicus.edu.al/?subpage=board&who=Marsonet |
| MR URL |
https://academicus.edu.al/nr6/Academicus-MMXII-6-020-034.html |
| MR URL |
https://academicus.edu.al/nr6/Academicus-MMXII-6-020-034.pdf |
| MR URL |
mailto:info@academicus.edu.al |
| MR URL |
https://academicus.edu.al/images/front_end/academicus.jpg |
| MR URL |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| Acess Indicators: |
|
OA – Open Access |
| OA License |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
Full Title
English
(eng)
|
Academicus International Scientific Journal |
| Publisher (01) |
Academicus International Scientific Journal |
| Country of publication |
Albania
(AL)
|
|
ISSN
|
20793715 |
| Product Form |
Printed Journal
(JB)
|
|
ISSN
|
23091088 |
| Product Form |
Online Journal
(JD)
|
| Journal Volume Number |
6 |
| Journal Issue Date (YYYY/MM) |
2012 / 06 |
Title
English
(eng)
|
A Limited View of Realism |
| Number of Pages |
15 |
| First Page |
20 |
| Last Page |
34 |
| Language of text |
English
(eng)
|
| Publication Date (YYYY/MM) |
2012 / 06 |
| Copyright |
2012, Academicus |
Abstract
Main description
(01)
|
In the paper we argue that no neat border line between ontology and epistemology can be drawn. This is due to the fact that
the separation between factual and conceptual is rather fuzzy, and the world is characterized by a sort of ontological opacity
which makes the construction of any absolute ontology difficult. Our ontology is characterized by the fact that the things
of nature are seen by us in terms of a conceptual apparatus that is inevitably influenced by mind-involving elements, and
all this has important consequences on both the question of scientific realism and the realism/anti-realism debate. Conceptualization
gives us access to the world, while, on the other, it is the most important feature of our cultural evolution. While the idealistic
thesis according to which the mind produces natural reality looks hardly tenable, it is reasonable to claim instead that we
perceive this same reality by having recourse to the filter of a conceptual apparatus whose presence is, in turn, connected
to the development of language and social organization. Our science is essentially relational, and not absolute. The information
with which it provides us is appropriate, but from our point of view. Science provides reliable information on the world,
but this information is always relative to a particular framework, and it is a mistake to think that the limits of our cognitive
capacities only have an aprioristic character. Science constantly attempts at providing answers to our questions about how
things stand in the world, and thus purports to offer reliable information about it. But it should also be recognized that
the extent to which science succeeds in accomplishing this task is disputable. What kind of realism, thus, can we actually
endorse? Despite what many relativists claim, realism still is an arguable and defendable position. If one asks what difference
is made to our knowledge claims if we accept the existence of an extra-conceptual world, the answer is the following: such
recognition undermines the diffused anthropocentric stance which identifies reality with our limited knowledge of it.
|
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