THIS DOI METADATA WAS LAST UPDATED: 2025-07-30 15:49
Full Title
HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND POLICY
Publisher
FrancoAngeli
ISSN
2240-9971 (Printed Journal)
2280-188X (Online Journal)
Journal Issue Number
1
Journal Issue Designation
1
Journal Issue Date
2025
Full Title
Strong, Weak, and Zero-Sum: A Commonsean Solution to Maffeo Pantaleoni's Quest for Contractual Settlements
By (author)
First Page
59
Last Page
79
Language of text
English
Publication Date
2025/06
Copyright
2025 FrancoAngeli srl
Main description
The paper explores Maffeo Pantaleoni's 1898 essay, focusing on his analysis of why rational agents enter mutualistic agreements, i.e. contracts, despite common predatory and parasitic behaviors. Pantaleoni classifies social relationships into predatory, parasitic, and mutualistic categories, anticipating the zero-sum logic where wealth is redistributed rather than created. The paper highlights the limitations of Pantaleoni's neglect of the legal system in shaping contracts, contrasting his ideas with legal realism, which emphasizes law's role in reducing transaction costs. It also connects Pantaleoni's work with John Rogers Commons's theory, extending his ideas into modern institutional economics.
Unstructured Citation
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