THIS DOI METADATA WAS LAST UPDATED: 2024-01-10 22:54
Full Title
RIVISTA DI ECONOMIA AGRARIA
Publisher
FrancoAngeli
ISSN
0035-6190 (Printed Journal)
2281-1559 (Online Journal)
Journal Issue Number
3
Journal Issue Designation
3
Journal Issue Date (YYYY/MM)
2014/07
Full Title
Empirical Research in Agricultural Contracts: Watch your Step
By (author)
First Page
27
Last Page
40
Language of text
Italian
Publication Date
2014/07
Copyright
2013 FrancoAngeli srl
Introduction or preface
Il presente studio confronta l'evoluzione della teoria dell'organizzazione economica e la struttura dei contratti agricoli, sulla base di specifiche evidenze empiriche. In sostanza, se gli economisti dell'organizzazione si occupano dell'analisi del funzionamento del sistema economico, l'analisi sviluppata nel lavoro dimostra come l'uso di dati raccolti sui contratti agrari non fornisce informazioni sufficienti e pone attenzione solo ad alcuni aspetti della struttura degli incentivi presenti nella maggior parte degli accordi istituzionali. L'assunto è che se si utilizzano dati basati su collezioni contrattuali esistenti, non considerando le dimensioni delle transazioni regolate con altre tipologie di contratti formali, o non considerando aspetti relazionali e di apprendimento dinamici incorporati nella relazione contrattuale, i risultati possono portare a false conclusioni.
Unstructured Citation
Alston L. (2008). The “Case” for Case Studies in New Institutional Economics. Edited by Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glanchant, Cambridge University Press.
Unstructured Citation
Barzel Y. (2002). A Theory of the State. Economic Rights, Legal Rights and the Scope of the State, Cambridge University Press, 289 pp.
Unstructured Citation
Coase H.R. (1991). The Institutional Structure of Production, Nobel Prize Lecture.
Unstructured Citation
Dixit A.K. (2007). Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance, Princeton University Press, 167pp.
Unstructured Citation
Greif A. (1993). Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Magrhobi Traders Coalition. American Economic Review, 83,3: 525-548.
Unstructured Citation
Holmström B., Milgrom P. (1994). The Firm as an Incentive System. American Economic Review, 84: 972-91.
Unstructured Citation
Joskow P. (1987). Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidences from the Coal Markets. The American Economic Review, 77, n. 1: 168-185.
Unstructured Citation
Klein B. (2000). The Role of Incomplete Contracts in Self- Enforcing Relationships. Revue d’Economie Industrielle, 92.
https://doi.org/10.3406/rei.2000.1037
Unstructured Citation
Leles C., Zylbersztajn D. (2012). Pacta Sunt Servanda Versus the Social Role of Contracts: the case of Brazilian agriculture contracts. Revista Brasileira de Economia e Sociologia Rural.
Unstructured Citation
Macneil (1978). Contracts: adjustments of long term economic relations under classical, and neoclassical contract law. Northwestern University Law Review, 72: 854-906.
Unstructured Citation
Masten S.E. (1998). Contract Choice. Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Edited by Boukaert B. and Geest D. de Elgar.
Unstructured Citation
Masten S.E., Saussier S. (2002). The Economics of Contracts: Theories and Applications. Edited by Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glanchant, Cambridge University Press.
Unstructured Citation
Sykuta M. (2001). Empirical Research on the Economics of Organization and the Role of Contracting and Organizations, Research Institute (CORI).
Unstructured Citation
Sykuta (2008). The New Institutional Econometrics: the Case of Research in Contracting and Organization. In New Institutional Economics: a guidebook. Edited by Eric Brusseau and Jean-Michel Glachant, Cambridge University Press.
Unstructured Citation
Williamson O.E. (1996). The Mechanisms of Governance. Oxford University Press.
Unstructured Citation
Vavra P. (2009). Role, Usage and Motivation of Contracts in Agriculture. OECD Working Paper Series, #13.