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Cite as
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Full Title
PARADIGMI
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Publisher
FrancoAngeli
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ISSN
1120-3404 (Printed Journal)
2035-357X (Online Journal)
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Journal Issue Number
3
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Journal Issue Designation
3
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Journal Issue Date (YYYY/MM)
2016/01
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Full Title
Consciousness, illusory freedom, double feel
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By (author)
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First Page
11
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Last Page
22
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Language of text
English
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Publication Date
2016/01
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Copyright
2015 FrancoAngeli srl
Introduction or preface
A proposito della coscienza si è scritto molto, sia in articoli scientifici, sia in libri destinati a un più vasto pubblico. Il tema risale almeno a Cartesio e Spinoza e fu già ammirevolmente trattato da Huxley (1974). L'opinione corrente, largamente condivisa, considera che le relative difficoltà tecniche, ma ancor più quelle metodologiche, sono talmente difformi da quelle della normale impresa scientifica da richiedere una completa revisione di ciò che si intende con "conoscere" e "spiegare". Prendendo come un dato non ulteriormente analizzato l'esperienza in prima persona della coscienza, queste sparse osservazioni cercheranno di estrarre ciò che è conosciuto della coscienza in terza persona, distinguendolo prudentemente da ciò che ne viene detto in modo più incerto e talvolta infondato. Ulteriormente il libero arbitrio, una componente importante della comune concezione di coscienza, verrà espunto dalla coscienza fenomenica perché non esiste. In conseguenza ciò che rimane da spiegare è l'incorreggibile illusione di scegliere liberamente, nonché le conseguenze etiche, giuridiche e psicologiche di una tale illusione
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