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Cite as
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Full Title
EPISTEMOLOGIA
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Publisher
FrancoAngeli
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ISSN
0392-9760 (Printed Journal)
1825-652X (Online Journal)
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Journal Issue Number
1
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Journal Issue Designation
1
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Journal Issue Date (YYYY/MM)
2014/07
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Full Title
Approximate truth vs. empirical adequacy
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By (author)
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First Page
106
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Last Page
118
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Language of text
English
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Publication Date
2014/07
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Copyright
2014 FrancoAngeli srl
Introduction or preface
Suppose that scientific realists believe that a successful theory is approximately true, and that constructive empiricists believe that it is empirically adequate. Whose belief is more likely to be false? The problem of underdetermination does not yield an answer to this question one way or the other, but the pessimistic induction does. The pessimistic induction, if correct, indicates that successful theories, both past and current, are empirically inadequate. It is arguable, however, that they are approximately true. Therefore, scientific realists overall take less epistemic risk than constructive empiricists.
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10.3280/EPIS2014-001007
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