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THIS DOI METADATA WAS LAST UPDATED: 2024-03-14 11:43
Cite as
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Full Title
ECONOMIA PUBBLICA
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Publisher
FrancoAngeli
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ISSN
0390-6140 (Printed Journal)
1972-5566 (Online Journal)
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Journal Issue Number
3
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Journal Issue Designation
3
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Journal Issue Date
2023
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Full Title
Tax evasion, tax reward and the optimal fiscal policy
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By (author)
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First Page
309
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Last Page
327
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Language of text
English
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Publication Date
2024/02
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Copyright
2023 FrancoAngeli srl
Main description
This theoretical paper studies the optimal fiscal policy in the presence of both pen- alties for tax evasion and rewards for tax compliance. Indeed, the presence of tax rewards changes the behaviour of firms and amplifies the role of the tax authority. In general, tax reward is able to reduce corporate tax evasion. However, the opti- mal fiscal policy depends on the fiscal scenario. Precisely, audit emerges as the main element of fiscal policy when tax evasion is widespread (negative scenario); whereas, in the positive fiscal scenario (where most people comply with tax rules), the range of fiscal policy choices is broader.
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